

**Problems of Democracy in Argentina: Alfonsín, Crisis and
Elections**

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I. BACKGROUND

One of the most significant characteristics of the Argentinian political system of the past years has been the weak role played by the political parties. This has come in the face of other strong political actors of a corporate nature, such as the unions and businesses, used to acting in the political system. This strange phenomenon could be fundamental in explaining the struggle that has been taking place in the Argentinian political arena post 1983. It could explain the failure to complete joint strategies, and could even be the reason behind the blocking of various initiatives to modernize purely instrumental aspects of the political system within its existing structure. The weakness of the political parties themselves, together with an unusual political culture, moved these parties further away from the centre of the political system and introduced the movementist logic into the picture. At Peronism's self-proclamation as the movement capable of uniting the popular identities en masse, there followed a sense of radicalism similar to that which around 1985 lit up the idea of the "third historical movement", able to guarantee a radical government through to the end of the century.

1. Characteristics of the Alfonsín government.

When Raul Alfonsín ascended to the presidency in December 1983, the past half century of Argentinian political history presented itself as an obstacle to be buried once and for all. The elimination of authoritarianism and the proscription of parties, the establishment of an unimposed and greatly changed political régime, the respect for human rights, and the modernisation of political society all formed the platform on which the new politics would be built.

President Alfonsín's obsession coincided perfectly with the old radical tradition of respect for the constitution and for individual rights. The scrupulousness with which he observed the rules of the game made him the first Argentinian President to serve his term in office, respecting the autonomy of the provinces that lay within the boundaries of the federal government's jurisdiction without using Article Six of the Constitution, so often employed by his predecessors to allow 'the Federal government to intervene in the provinces. In a similar vein, in 1987 he renewed the posts of provincial governor by democratic election, for the first time since 1962. The four elections, held biannually beginning in 1983, were of an ordered, regularity that had been nonexistent since that unusual first period of Peronism (1946-1955). Finally, the termination of his six year old presidential term, and his substitution by another, democratically elected, president, was something that had not occurred since 1928. It could even be said that this was hitherto

unheard of in Argentina under the law of universal suffrage, if we take into account the fact that the presidential replacement was selected from among candidates of decidedly, different political affiliations.

In the face of these undeniable and well defined successes, the Raul Alfonsín government appears sketchy with regards to setting in motion policies to combat the problem derived from the above character of the Argentinian political system. Chronologically there are four clearly defined periods in the Alfonsín government, each of these essentially defined by the electoral periods: 1983-85, 1985-87, 1987-89, and the last, or "transitory" period from May to July 1989. One can also distinguish at least four general thematic blocks.

The first of these is the military issue, closely linked with that of human rights. Immediately after ascending to the presidency, Raul Alfonsín, by way of the attorney general, prosecuted the members of the three military juntas of the "Proceso", (1976-1983) led respectively by Generals Videla, Viola and Galtieri. They were charged with having violated human rights and their responsibilities in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands affair. The conviction of the members of these three military juntas, who received varying prison sentences, was seen as a milestone in civil-military relations in Latin America. Nonetheless, this sentencing did not mean that the military was to be controlled from then on by the government. Corporate pressure I came from the various branches of the Armed Forces, and from several institutions in the public sector,. embodied by the human rights organisations, which were particularly active in 1982-83 and which desired considerable extension of the military's responsibilities for the protection of human rights, and from right wing groups. All of the above, combined with an extremely active public opinion and a lack of decisiveness on the part of the government, led to a state of ambiguity and of almost permanent questioning of the Armed Forces. The laws of "punto final" and "obediencia debida",. together with the events of the Easter Week of 1987, of the Monte Caseros episode and, finally, of Villa Martelli, appeared as unconnected juridical and political matters that served only to emphasise the general incompetence of the Executive branch. This incompetence seemed to be spilling over, and appeared unable to deal with crisis or to retake the initiative of the first moments of the presidential term.

Union relations were defined by the attempts of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) to remodel, through the Confederación General de Trabajadores (CGT), the role that the unions had been playing in Argentina since 1955 (1). In a sense, the question was one of relocating the unions within the Argentinian political system and establishing more modern guidelines. The proposed law concerning the restructuring of the unions, sent to Congress by the Executive branch, was rejected

by the former, owing to the influence of the provinces (governed mainly by Peronists) within the Senate. Dissension within the Peronist camp, emphasised by the 1985 legislative elections, in which the Peronist family showed itself to be divided between the Partido Justicialista and the Frejuli (Movement of October 17th), suggested in the radical headquarters the idea of,. provoking discord among the Justicialists with the aim of accelerating the process of disintegration, and thus achieving the desired effect with regards the aforementioned legislative-" initiative. In this sense, the appointment of the union-leader Alderete was, for the Ministerio de Trabajo, an operation destined to destabilize union power.

1987 found Justicialism completely reorganised; the CGT continued to submit the UCR government to relentless union pressure, declaring thirteen general strikes in six years, and Alderete continued to be a token figure. All of the Radicals' hopes to the contrary could do . nothing to hinder the renovation of the Justicialist Party, the renovation being led by Antonio Cafiero, elected governor of the province of Buenos Aires in 1987. The study carried out by the UCR concluded that Peronism would "commit political suicide" once their supposedly less acceptable figures rose to prominence. This strategy failed when Cafiero lost the nomination for the Peronist candidate to the presidency, which went instead to Carlos Menem, governor of La Rioja, and someone who could count on the support of the more established sectors of Justicialism, such as the more traditionally unionist areas.

The handling of the economic question arose as one of the key issues of the Alfonsín government. The situation was one of a productive capability seriously damaged by the neoliberal economic policies carried out under the "Proceso". The country found itself with a national debt so large that it inhibited further investment in Argentina and dramatically limited the export funds available for the paying off of this debt, and with inflationary tendencies that were a preview of the fall of the system into the spiral of hyperinflation. The state was in a position of crisis, and virtual bankruptcy. The formula used to carry out the economic policy was based partly on shock tactics and partly on a notable lack of both political (within Congress) and economical (among the unions and businessmen) instruments for reaching consensus. The outstanding instrument of economic policy was the Austral Plan (June 1985). The failure of this plan was largely caused by the impossibility of carrying out any real structural reforms, and by the inconsistency of the government in following its course of action with regards the various pressures upon it. This was aggravated by the fact that this was not the moment to carry out their chosen option, even if it had been blindly accepted by the Executive branch. Its method consisted once again, with few exceptions, of putting into action, three years later, another Spring Plan, which failed this time due to the same lack of conviction on the part of its creators. The poor state of the economy exploded dramatically in the first

months of 1989, considerably affecting the outcome of the presidential elections. In barely three months, the number of australs in the dollar had increased five fold, and according to official figures, inflation rose to 33.4% for the month of April. This was the highest it had been since March of 1976, the month in which a military coup was carried out against the government of "Isabelita", Perón.

Political reform became an obsession with President Alfonsín as a way to modernize a regime that had changed little from its 1853 constitutional definition. It was obvious that the old constitution was, in more ways than one, no longer adequate: from the very language in which it was written; to its restriction of the number of ministers to eight; from its indirect form of presidential election; to (as we shall see later) the required Roman-Catholic affiliation of the President and Vice-President, among others. It was equally inadequate in more strictly political terms: in the duration of the presidential term; in the biannual renewal by halves of the House of Deputies and the triannual renewal of the third part of the Senate; in the more controversial inexistence of the figure of Prime Minister, whose main role would be as chief of public administration; and finally, in the creation of a Social Economic Council (3). This and the clear difference between the reformist doctrine of President Alfonsín and the reality of the political regime, brought about the necessity of a constitutional reform. There were two main ideas upon which this reality rested: the inevitable carrying out of an agreed upon constitutional reform, and the necessity of the creation of a Council for the Consolidation of Democracy, in charge of developing theoretical elements of the political debate. The Radical electoral upset of 1987, and the aforementioned replacement by Carlos Menem of Antonio Cafiero as leader of the Justicialist Party, put an end to hopes of reconciliation, especially now that important Peronist sectors saw the constitutional reform as one more pawn in the hegemonic strategy of Alfonsinism, and were convinced that it was being used to hide the real motives of the radical leader, which revolved around the possibility of his reelection.

2. The Issue of the Consolidation of Democracy

The government that emerged after the recovery of democratic liberties in the 1983 elections saw its role defined by a constant tension that appeared when the demand for instant action, brought about by the serious economic and political-military crisis, added itself to the necessity of installing a new political system. This became even more complicated when it was Alfonsín himself, surrounded by the charismatic nature of his leadership, who acted not only to legitimise the political issues but also to overcome conflicts. The administration of the continual crisis, within, highly personal and scarcely agreed limits, made difficult

the creation of an "institutional system capable of being changed into a privileged area for exchanges among political actors" and, as such, greatly complicated the possibility of complete consolidation (4).

Another central question facing democratic regimes, and one upon which their very survival depends, is the ability that their institutions should have to respond to social demands. This is one of the definitive differences between democracies and authoritarianisms, the objective of the latter being not to respond to demands, but to repress them. Nonetheless, the Argentinian society is one impregnated by a corporatism in which the political parties are not the only focus of the political structure of the social institutions (5). As such, the political parties do not act efficiently as intermediaries. Social demands are only dealt with quickly in moments of grave crisis, or at times when the corporations feel that there may be something to be gained by swift action. In short, the social dislocation and the resulting weight of the corporate powers are linked to the way in which politics are run in Argentina, and which even today affect both majority and minority politics.

Raul Alfonsín's insistence on the carrying out of the stipulated periodical elections during his term, this being something frequently violated in previous times, would therefore seem somewhat inadequate. It could even, at the slightest presidential alteration in the elections, restrict the success of the Argentinian political transition (6). Although presidential change is of vital importance in assuring the regulated development of the political regime, it does not in itself guarantee either the safety or the regular functioning of the system. In a way, the cyclical pattern fulfills, as far as governmental change is concerned, an essential function in the selection of political elites. Nonetheless, this model, outlined by several political scientists for the study of stable democracies in Latin America, and one that implies both social change and economic and social decentralization, could prove to be useful (7).

On another level, the analysis of political institutions and sociocultural and socioeconomic variables, presents itself as a way of investigating the problem of consolidation (8): the persistence of a strongly authoritarian political culture; the presence of an intense socioeconomic crisis, provoked equally by internal and external factors; and the questioning of the efficacy of the political institutions in Argentina, raise doubts about the consolidation of the democratic system, in spite of the comparative successes.

However, another very different question is that of the decomposition of Argentinian democracy. The elements that appear in the classic literature on the processes of the breakdown of democracies (9), are present in Argentina today only

with regards the effectiveness and efficiency of the system. From an observation of the remaining elements it could be inferred that the system is not, for the moment, threatened by fracture or regressions: the legitimacy of the regime is reinforced periodically at the ballot box and by placing the power of decision within the legal framework; the imperfect two party system ensures the governability of the houses, in which the Peronist party had the absolute majority after the legislative elections of May 1989, including within in the massive opposition that aligned itself in what is considered the "legal opposition" and which rejects the traditional search for military support; the stability of the governors under Raul Alfonsín has insured against political crisis and loss of power, as was shown after the electoral overturning of his party; finally, violence, the cause of the previous stages of deterioration, does not appear to be present in an organised form, either against the state, or as "legitimate" violence against the enemies of the state.

3. Is Democracy Simply Elections?

The influence of Robert Dahl (10) on many of the studies of the processes of democratization in Latin America in the eighties, has implied that in the majority of cases, and following the traditional process of the formation of liberal democracies (poliarchies), the new democracies should also have to pass through two lines of development: pluralist competence and political participation. This set the trend for the debate on the theory of democracy, which divided those who were in favour of democracy without adjectives from those who favoured a social and economic democracy (11). During the almost six years of the Alfonsín term, the electoral variable occupied an unquestionable position in the Argentinian political spectrum, achieving almost unparalleled successes, as was indicated in the first point of this introduction. The high rate of voter participation, the regular repetition of the electoral date, in keeping with the constitution, the absence of foul play, and the recognition and acceptance of the final results by all involved, guaranteed the impact of the electoral process on the Argentinian political system.

The 1983 elections would seem to have signaled the restoration of democratic liberty and the recovery of fully open political competition, as had happened ten years earlier. But it was in that very decade that there was to arise massive electoral support for Raul Alfonsín, the presidential candidate for the UCR, who was to lead an ethical opposition against the proposed "union-military" pact, and who would also embody the old radical spirit of democratic recovery. The punitive vote inflicted on the Peronist opposition, that all but wiped out the enormous electoral participation of the two 1973 elections, was swamped beneath a completely unsatisfactory management of the economic crisis, subversive struggles,

countersubversive struggles of any political persuasion, and the inexistence of an even minimally functional state. The Radical triumph was consolidated by obtaining an absolute majority in the House of Deputies. For its part, the Justicialist party, while still strong in the interior provinces, became the majority party in the Senate.

The 1985 elections for the renewal of half of the House of Deputies, saw an increase in the percentage vote in favour of the UCR, and a considerable decrease in the vote for the Justicialist party (12), which found itself in complete crisis and on the verge of disintegration.

In 1987, elections were held once more to renew the House of Deputies, and to decide on the posts of Provincial Governor, whose term is of four years' duration. The strength of the Peronist Renovador nominee was the most significant event of the elections. The recovery of the Justicialist Party was evidenced essentially by two events: the recovery of its traditional position as majority party (a position occupied since 1946), which made the UCR lose its absolute majority in the House of Deputies, and the upset of the heir of Alfonsínism, Juan Manuel Casella by its candidate for governor of the province of Buenos Aires, Antonio Cafiero. The former was supposed to have had an obstacle free path to the Casa Rosada. All these took on an innovatory aspect, bearing in mind the character of the punitive vote two years later against the unsuccessful Radical government, and the swing of part of the right Radical vote in favour of the Unión de Centro Democrático.

The 1989 election, brought forward for electoralist reasons to May when it could equally well have been set back to July (13), were for the partial renewal of the provincial legislative houses, the renewal of half of the House of Deputies, and for the election, in accordance with the indirect voting system of those.

II. THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

1. Some Speculations

The Argentinian constitution of 1853, still intact, is heavily influenced by the Constitution of the United States; this influence is noticeable most in the adoption of the presidential style of government and in the indirect election of the President (14). The Constitution regulates this election down to the last detail, and its lack of revision has maintained this system intact throughout Argentinian political history. The manner of the election of a President is dealt with in articles 81 and 85 of the Constitution. In these it is stated that "The capital and each of the provinces will nominate by direct vote an assembly of representatives, equal in number to the

total of deputies and senators that represent them in Congress ... and who, once gathered in their respective capitals, four months before the end of the presidential term, will proceed to elect the President and Vice-President of the nation..."

There have been twenty one indirect elections in Argentina between 1854 and 1989 (As well as three presidential elections, in 1951 and twice in 1973, and one vice-presidential election, that were decided by direct vote). For all apart from these exceptions (and apart from the 1949 election under the Peronist constitution) the same constitutional text has prevailed, but the electoral laws have changed profoundly, distorting the original text. Initially it was designed in accordance with the thinking of Alexander Hamilton, as a method "capable of avoiding the disorder and tumult that a direct presidential election would provoke in a republic". Its composers believed that a "prudent dispersion of the voters", gathered in small groups, "would inspire in them a reasoned judgement for nominating with complete autonomy the First Magistrate". Later, the development of the political parties obliged all who would be President to serve some time first in political society before attempting to enter the closely guarded inner precinct. The assemblies were, as a consequence, a reflection of the diverse movements of opinion which, thanks to the evolution towards universal suffrage, were turning the members of which they were comprised into obligatory agents for any candidate; the system was working in such a way that political society was articulated in two main options.

Finally, the linking of the elected positions to the different electoral laws that were being introduced, produced, great inequality in the representation of the electoral districts. The adoption of a proportional criterion in the electoral legislation undermined the two party system, while the distortion of the number of representatives corresponding to each district, assigning a minimum of fourteen, doubled the originally stipulated figure in small provinces such as La Rioja, Chubut and Santa Fe (15).

The preelection polls for the 1989 elections, together with other studies (16), speculated on the possibility of none of the candidates achieving an absolute majority in the electoral college, or, more precisely, that no candidate would achieve "his own electoral college". By this, one is reminded that in the elections of 1868, 1916 and 1963, in which were elected Presidents Sarmiento, Yrigoyen and Illía, there was no absolute majority in the assembly of voters, but that the remaining seventeen elections decided by indirect vote had candidates with large majorities.

The inspection of the voting lists submitted by the assemblies of voters is carried out by the Legislative Assembly, which is the combination of the House of Deputies and the Senate. If no candidate receives an absolute majority, then

Congress, of whose members at least three quarters must be present, will decide from "between the two candidates who have received the greatest number of votes".

The possibility that none of the candidates of the majority parties would have their own electoral college raised speculations, constructed under parliamentary logic, of possible alliances between the candidates to achieve a majority, for example between either the Justicialist party of the UCR, and the third national party, the Unión de Centro Democrático,. comfortable in its pivotal position, even though its own calculations could lead to an error in the consideration of the relative importance of the district and political parties.

Similarly, there was speculation of a situation of grave consequences and with little chance of solution: the possible blocking of any congressional action by the absence of a parliamentary bench, which would prevent its quorum.

In any case, these were clearly ridiculous distortions of an indirect electoral system, applied to circumstances much more complex than those of a century earlier. The substantial weight of the vote of the scarcely Populated provinces, and the very dynamics of a system that was not two party, introduced a strong factor of instability into elections that were highly competitive in and of themselves.

2. Candidates and Programs

The Argentinian party system has one variable that is not uncommendable, which is the gestation of provincial and national parties. In a presidential election, these newest parties take their number of votes to the national formulas, although in the cases in which the provincial "particularismo" has a marked influence, they propose their own candidates to the assembly of voters so as, later and if necessary, to negotiate their vote in the electoral college.

In the May 1989 elections there were a total of ten national proposals (17) and forty six provincial proposals. Notwithstanding, the election focused almost exclusively on the presidential candidates of the Justicialist party and the UCR, Carlos Saúl Menem and Eduardo Angeloz respectively. Menem, with Eduardo Duhalde -as running mate for the Vice-Presidency, was supported by the Frente Justicialista de la Unidad Popular (18) and by the Partido Blanco de Jubilados, an interest group that campaigned principally in Buenos Aires and in the federal capital.

Both the UCR and the Confederación Federalista Independiente (CFI) (19) lent their support to Eduardo Angeloz, although the former preferred Juan Manuel Casella as a running mate, while the latter wished to see Cristina Guzmán in the number two position.

On a more marginal level were candidates, Alvaro Alsogaray of the Centrist Alliance (20), Guillermo Estevez Boero of the United Socialist Alliance, Néstor Vicente of the United Left Alliance, and Jorge Altamira of the Workers' Party. In the event, Alvaro Alsogaray received a considerably larger share of the vote than any other of these lesser candidates.

Both Menem and Angeloz came to the elections with similar political backgrounds; both were politicians from the interior, both had been elected Governor (of La Rioja and Córdoba respectively) and neither of them was the nominated leader of the party they represented. The differences in their electoral manifestos were mainly of form rather than content. When the time came, therefore, the assembly based its vote on two main considerations: the relative merits and demerits of six years under a Radical administration, and the personalities of the two party leaders, which had been clearly revealed during the course of the election.

The FREJUPO centered its program around the somewhat confusing term "productive revolution". This was understood intuitively by the lower and lower middle class electorate who, hit hard by the crisis, opposed the speculative economy" (capital) with the productive economy" (labour). Terminology aside, the proposals were destined to respond on a more immediate level to the friction that had existed under the radical government. In this way, it advocated the stable maintenance of employment, the reconversion of public companies to companies that would be "social property", the adjustment of minimum wage to the cost of the "family food basket", and the absolute protection of the right to strike. Neither did they suggest new criteria for dealing with the national debt: deeply frustrated by the way in which the Alfonsín government had failed to handle this problem, the Peronists considered that a drastic change to this would be to include Congress, so that they could approve the negotiations. The foreign policy proposed by the FREJUPO did not differ from that which had been previously maintained; it insisted on the inclusion of Argentina in Latin America by way of regional integration, and on the need to present the United Nations with a proposal for direct negotiations with the United Kingdom over the sovereignty of the Falklands/Malvinas. Relations with the Armed Forces were proposed along very different lines to those drawn by the Radicals, and if there was no actual suggestion of an amnesty, there was

nonetheless talk of the need to reach a reconciliation with society, which, logically, could not exclude the military sector. Finally, as far as political reform was concerned, Menem showed himself to be in favour of reducing the presidential term from six to four years, including in the Constitution the provision that no president serve more than two terms.

The UCR proposals were based substantially on a continuation of the policies that had been carried out prior to their election. These were notably: the decreasing of the national deficit; privatization as a means to integral reforms of the State; democratization of labour relations, with the guarantee of democracy and pluralism in the unions; the search for a political solution to the national debt; and no concession of any amnesty to, or reconciliation for the sentenced military leaders.

In the face of the proposals formulated by the two majority parties was launched the program of the Centrist Alliance, an absolute masterpiece of neoliberalism of the "new right". The program demanded that the State withdraw from all managerial regulations and interventions, and that it be reduced to carrying out its primary functions of justice, foreign relations, defense, and internal security. Capitalisation, and hence the reduction of the national debt, should be carried out by the negotiation of activities within the State's control. With regards to foreign policy, there was a proposed increase in the links with western democracies, and the abandonment of Argentina's Non Alignment Movement. Finally, concerning relations between the Armed Forces and civilian society, it was proposed that the former wage war on subversion, but that other than in cases of proven crimes against humanity, they rescind their convictions and suspend their trials. There was also a proposal to reduce military service to three months.

The various left wing coalitions (the Izquierda Unida, Unidad Socialista (21), and the Partido Obrero) emphasised in their programs the policies of nationalisation, the role of the State in the search for a more equitable distribution of income and resources, the unity of the organised workers' movement and the strengthening of the unions, the unpaid national debt, an agrarian reform that would make possible the expropriation of the latifunds, the support of integration into Latin America, the continuation of the Non Alignment Movement, and finally, the annulment of the laws of "punto final" and "obediencia debida".

3. On preelection polls.

Since the announcement of the presidential candidates in August of 1988, the different polls taken up through to May 14th 1989 all had Menem as the most

likely victor. This affirmation, however, should be qualified by two observations: the number of undecided was greater than 20% until two weeks before the election, and the margin between the two candidates began decreasing in February and March of 1989 (22). Both of these might help us to understand how Menem's triumph was secured definitively in the month preceding the election date, a date, we should remember that was set by the government with an eye on the current political climate.

The predictions most favourable to Angeloz were those of a poll taken on April 24th, which concluded that the intended vote was 32.4% for Menem (which would translate into 212 delegates)- and 31.8% for Angeloz (210 delegates), with 22.7% undecided (131 unoccupied seats) (23). One week later, the predictions were 38% for Menem, 32% for Angeloz, and 14% undecided (24). This meant that the support for the UCR candidate found itself stabilising at its traditional third of the vote, while the undecided were turning out in favour of the Peronist candidate.

4. The Election Campaign (25)

In considering elections in which both presidential and legislative contests were being decided, it comes to mind that the electoral campaign was dominated by two events of a different nature both institutionally and territorially.

However, an unusual incident of the period immediately preceding it became a constant part of the election campaign. Union moderation extended throughout the country, not only for the popular demobilisation that was put forward by the Secretary of Social action of the CGT, Pedro Goyeneche, but by the social agreement reached between the CGT and Argentina's Industrial Union of employers, to postpone lay offs and suspensions until one month after the elections. The effort was an attempt to create a peaceful social climate before the predictable Peronist triumph, and to show the electorate how the Peronist party could better govern due to its close relation with the unions.

Menem conducted an emotional campaign; his discourse was an "antidiscourse", a reflection of a tense situation, and a rejection of any strictly rational response. The speeches were spartan, with a brief and direct message that reached quickly for certain sectors of the public, and was not entirely devoid of religious overtones: "Follow me, I will not betray you", and "God bless you all", being repeated often. Once more he used his concept of "the people" with which he had become permanently identified, and was the product of his conviction that he had a majority because he had "the support of 'the people' and 'the people'".

represent the majority". In this light, and given that the majority was already his, Menem ceased his television campaigning weeks before election day. His small screen absence was not to cost him a single vote, despite the fact that the UCR publicity, approaching the matter rationally, upbraided his refusal to face Angeloz in debate (26). Finally Menem, rather than focusing his campaign on large conventions, created a caravan of supporters with himself at the head in a "Menem Mobil". The purpose of this was three fold: firstly, he did not have to face the statistical post mortems concerning the exact number present at his conventions, since it was impossible to count the numbers that poured into the streets and waved from their houses; secondly, he avoided the lengthy speeches that would not have been avoidable at large, concentrated gatherings; finally, he sold the image created previously by the Pope, of someone superior and distant, yet at the same time close because he was in full view of everyone.

Angeloz carried out a completely different strategy, full of rationality, speeches and ideological debate. Guided by the opinion polls, he focused his campaign on gaining the female and the undecided vote, and tried unsuccessfully to draw Menem into a televised debate. In spite of having distanced himself from the politics of Alfonsín, he once more took up the question of ethics, an approach that was so necessary and effective in the 1983 elections, but that was of marginal importance in such troubled times: "we may have made mistakes in economic matters, but we left a country free from torture, free from bloodshed, and free from deaths". In this sense the legacy of Alfonsín's political acts weighed heavily on the Angeloz campaign, despite the fact that it closed with tremendous receptions in the federal capital and Córdoba.

The UCeDé, whose success in the 1987 elections had made it an authentic third party, tried to avoid at all costs the polarisation of the electorate, so as to retain its position as a pivotal party. To this end it followed a course designed to lessen the weight of the propaganda of the two majority parties, especially that of the UCR, which insisted on the importance of the "useful vote". At the same time the campaign was directed towards the search for a "new" space in Argentinian politics, which it found, paradoxically, in political and economic liberalism, the quintessence of politics two generations earlier. In any event, this was the party that most clearly separated their presidential campaign from their legislative campaign. As we shall see, they were more successful in the latter.

5. The Results

Once the voting for the members of the electoral assembly had taken

place, it was clear that constitutionalist concern over a possible institutional block was misplaced, as Carlos Menem had received a comfortable majority which would allow him his "own electoral college". Menem triumphed everywhere except the federal capital, Córdoba, Salta and Chubut, where Angeloz was the winning candidate. He managed to rebuild Peronism's historical political base, and came close to achieving that mythical 50% of the electorate.

With respect to the 1983 elections, Peronism not only installed itself in those districts in which they had traditionally counted on popular support, but also in the previously hostile territory of Entre Rios, Mendoza, Rio Negro and Santa Fé, among others.

Justicialism recovered its traditional domination in Buenos Aires, receiving 53.4% of the popular vote, as opposed to the 42.2% who supported Lúder in 1983. At the same time, in the traditional Radical freehold of the federal capital, there were even more surprising results: Angeloz and Menem were separated by only 8% (45% and 37% respectively) whereas in 1983 the difference between Alfonsín and Lúder was 37% (64.3% and 27.3% respectively).

Menem not only remade the traditional Peronist bloc of support, but also changed classic electoral behaviour; sectors which had never voted Peronist until 1983 chose his option (in a situation in which two party logic prevailed) as retribution for the conduct of the outgoing President's government.

Even though numerous analyses during the electoral campaign indicated that Angeloz lacked the complete support of President Alfonsín and of the UCR itself, this fact, if fact it was, did not figure prominently in the electorate's thinking, or at least not in the undecided Vote (whose preelection figure fluctuated between 25% and 30%), whose final decision was based on the fulfillment or unfulfillment of their expectations for the previous government.

As has been mentioned above, the logic governing this type of election is two party logic, or bipolarisation. It has been shown that in Argentina this is a waning tendency; while in 1983, 91.9% of the electorate voted for one of the two majority candidates, in 1989, even including the votes for parties with their own representation but with previously declared alliance, this figure was down to 86.8%. This slight tendency towards an increase in the number of non polarised votes could be a new argument in favour of change in the electoral voting system, as there is every indication that if this tendency continues the next presidential elections could turn out to be a real institutional headache, and one that will be difficult to resolve.

With 37% of the vote, the Radical candidate received almost the same percentage of the vote as the UCR in the 1987 legislative elections. Although it is obvious that this percentage of the vote was not sufficient for him to be elected President under a majority system, it was no less obvious that the governing party's candidate did not provoke a decrease in his party's vote, although it was clear that he was not going to increase it either, given the manifestly adverse political situation, characterised by considerable attrition of support for the government.

There was a similar occurrence with the UCeDé candidate, whose figure of 6%, despite optimistic predictions, improved only very slightly on the results of 1987. The Argentinian right barely grew in the federal capital, and only made real headway in Buenos Aires and Mendoza, at the hands of the Democratic Party.

III. THE ELECTION OF NATIONAL DEPUTIES

1. Disparities with respect to the presidential election

Article 42 of the Constitution of the Argentine Nation establishes the renewal of the House of Deputies "by halves every two years". After the democratic transition of 1983, national legislative elections have been held in 1983, 1985 and 1989. Legislative elections were to have been held in 1987.

For these elections, Argentina is divided into 24 electoral districts, made up of the twenty two provinces, the federal capital, and the territory of Tierra del Fuego. The electoral law establishes the form of proportional representation for all the districts, the system of closed and blocked lists, the division of the remainder by the D'Hondt system, and a 3% threshold that all must pass to qualify for a share of the seats.

Having elections that renew only half of one house produces a "gradualism" effect in the political system, as it is free from the swift oscillations that occur with some frequency in unstable political environments, and that can lead to a complete replacement of the parliamentary elites.

In a political system as firmly presidential as the Argentinian one, when the legislative and presidential elections coincide, the former take a back seat to the latter. Nonetheless, the voter clearly understands the significance of both elections, leading to a slight division in the voting, and producing certain peculiar effects on the party system that we will examine later on. The different configuration of both elections is emphasised by the fact that alliances forged in the presidential fire are

not maintained at a legislative level.

2. Candidates and results

Although the Justicialist success in the legislative elections of 1987 was notable, it only translated into a loss for the radicals of the absolute majority in the House of Deputies. Overall, the radicals continued to be the majority party. When the electoral polls predicted victory for Menem, the strategy of the three major parties centered on the acquisition or control of the majority in the House of Deputies (27). For the Justicialist party, the question was one of shoring up their presumed triumph in the presidential election with the control of the Legislative Power. This would guarantee a period of at least two years during which they could carry out their political designs free from any institutional block. The Radicals, on the other hand, were fighting to prevent their loss from turning into an uproot, and to prevent the peronists from gaining their hoped for absolute control. Similarly, the "centrist right" of the UCeDé hoped to see itself in a pivotal position, so that no party could gain a parliamentary majority without its support; in this sense we must see the attacks by this party on the radicals as being much more virulent than those on the Peronists.

As might have been expected, the pull exercised by the candidate representing the opposition was the undoing of the Peronists in the House of Deputies, as was Alfonsín's alliance in favour of the Radicals in the October elections of 1983. The Peronists had sixty six seats, when there were only fifty three deputies up for renewal (forty eight bona fide Peronists and five of the Intransigent Party); the radicals lost twenty four seats; and the centrists gained four seats. The absolute majority of the House, as it had in 1983 and 1985, passed into the hands of a single party, although in this instance the party in question (the Peronists) gained control of both the Executive power and the Legislative power.

The UCR, for the first time, ceased to be the majority party in the federal capital, a position that was taken over by the FREJUPO. The Centrist Alliance, on the other hand, despite not reaching their hoped for percentage, gained the largest number of votes in their history, with 22%. At the head of their roster was Adelina de Viola, who in the event lost his personal battle with Dante Caputo, number one on the list of the UCR (28.4%). Both were surpassed by the FREJUPO roster, which, with Miguel Angel Toma at its head, received 31.5% of the vote. Despite his loss in the legislative battle for the capital, Adelina de Viola achieved one of the most notable results of the elections: he bettered by more than ten points the percentage received by Alvaro Alsogaray, the party's traditional leader and presidential

candidate.

In the province of Buenos Aires the composition of parties with parliamentary representation differed in as much as it was in this district where was the greatest instance of the integration of the Intransigent Party into the FREJUPO. This had the effect of increasing the number Justicialist votes, and could lead in the future to the disappearance of Oscar Alende's party, which was elected under the trappings of Peronism. The centrist alliance improved thanks to the number of radical votes translating into four seats, their best absolute result in any election. The Unión Izquierdista and the White Partido Blanco de Jubilados, this latter of a poujadist character close to Peronism, gained their only seats in Buenos Aires.'

The coinciding of an electoral district with a province, except in the aforementioned cases of the capital and Tierra del Fuego, makes possible the traditional apparition of provincial parties that can contend with the nationals for seats in the government. In the presidential elections these parties generally either decide not to present their own candidate, to the benefit of larger parties, or they ally themselves previously with one of the majority parties.

In the May 1989 elections of the House of Deputies, the provincial parties in Corrientes, Neuquén, San Juan and Santiago del Estero, each obtained one seat, while Tucumán obtained two (see table IV). These provinces then aligned themselves with those of Jujuy, Mendoza, Rio Negro and Salta, which already had achieved national representation. Even with all that, the influence of the these provincial representatives in the House of Deputies is minimal. To counter the effect of their numerical weakness, the provincial parties align themselves with one of the majority parties, either by simple integration (for example with the Corriente Renovadora party of Santiago del Estero, integrated into the Justicialist group) or by parliamentary cooperation (for example the coordination of the Pacto Autonomista Liberal de Corrientes with the UCeDé).

3. The Split of the Vote

One of the most complicated interpretational problems that arises when two different elections are carried out simultaneously is that of identifying the behaviour of the voters in each, in other words how the votes are split between the two. This frequent phenomenon, in which the voter identifies with widely different interests depending on the elections, faces certain difficulties in Argentina. In effect, the existence of only one ballot box, which includes the different candidates in the same format, obliges the voter to execute a laborious series of cuts if he or she

wishes to vote differently in each election (28).

In the May 1989 elections, it was shown that the split of the vote, with its manifest technical difficulty, was greater in those districts with a higher degree of urbanisation, where there is supposedly a higher degree of political democratic culture (table VII).

A comparative analysis of the electoral flow in the presidential and legislative elections shows that the two majority parties tend to receive more votes in the former than in the latter. This accentuates the concentration of the vote, and hence the bipolarisation, of both elections.

The legislative elections, on the other hand, are almost genuinely multi-party, with the majority parties losing votes relative to their percentages in the presidential election. In this instance, the UCR lost twice as many votes as the Peronists, in the capital, Buenos Aires and Córdoba. From this it could be inferred, with more precise analysis of the electoral tables, that Peronism gains votes from the left in the polarised presidential election, only to give them back in the legislative ones. There is a similar relation between the UCR and the right. Taking only the cases of the Capital and Buenos Aires, (table VI) we see that in the former the Peronists and allied parties lose 5.1 percentage points in the presidential election relative to the legislative election, while the left gains 4.8%. Similarly, the radical coalition loses 9.6 points, while the right gains 9.7. In Buenos Aires the situation is similar, though less marked: the Peronists lose 1.8 points and the left gains 2.6; the Radicals lose 3.7 points and the right gains 3.1.

One of the unknown constants in Argentinian politics is the difficulty of labeling the post 1946 parties as either "left" or "right". It could be maintained, however, that apart from the volatile, or "turncoat" electorate, and as long as the search is one for a useful vote with immediate results in the election, the left in 1989 has been inclined towards the Peronists, while the right has tended towards the Radical vote. Notwithstanding this hypothesis, only an empirical study of the split of the vote can lead us to definite conclusions, given that compensating for "cross cuts" is technically possible (29).

IV. THE NEW POLITICAL SOLUTION

As opposed to the situation of six years ago, the problem facing Argentina today is not the destabilisation of its democratic regime, but the strictly democratic governing of its society. For any observer of the situation it must appear astonishing

that a political system characterised by its weakness should have survived the absence of any real power for May to July of 1989 without trauma, and without adverse forces bringing the system to the ground.

The indisputable figures for the current political situation show us that, as in 1983, one party has gained control of the Executive power and part of the Legislative power (the House of Deputies) for a period of six and at least two years, respectively. However, in 1983 it was the UCR, whereas now it is the Justicialist party that is in control. Moreover, today the majority party has complete control over the Legislative power owing to its absolute majority in the Senate.

For the first time in Argentinian history, the clear majority party of the last half century has replaced another democratically elected government, assuring a correct variance in the political elite. When Peronism was voted into power in 1946 and 1973, the situation immediately preceding it was one of institutional breakdown and authoritarianism marked by the presence of the Armed Forces. This partially twisted the behaviour of the Justicialists, who came close to a dynamic of messianic characteristics, trying to take up and represent all the strange values of the Argentinian society of before. Its identification with popular and national values generated a movement completely unlike that of any classical political party.

In 1989 the Argentinian political institutions found themselves working again after six uninterrupted years in which the political norm had scaled heights that would be difficult to find in earlier times. The current analyses of the actions of Raúl Alfonsín's government and of Alfonsínism as a theory and political praxis point towards a thesis that might explain the failure of both as a ways and means of decision making. Nonetheless, it seems clear that one immediately positive consequence has been to give the opposition access to power via free elections, while a negative effect has been to submerge the country in economic chaos unprecedented even given Argentina's unfortunate tradition in this area (30).

With regards to the country's political direction, Carlos Menem's triumph would seem to suggest the return to a style dominated by charisma rather than rationality, a switch that had already been made in the internal Justicialist elections of 9/7/88 (31). In this sense, Menem's success is quite unique; it could signal a government in which all the union paraphernalia and the classic Justicialist "leadership" are gradually substituted by different matters with characteristics similar to those taking place in other countries in Latin America. The newly civilianised right, separated from the possibility of direct military intervention, seems to have access to an ever expanding power of legitimate decision making. From this position, the pragmatist logic shows itself to be implacable, both in economic

matters, in which the means of carrying out their policies had a huge social cost, and in strictly political affairs, where the plans for "national reconciliation" include returning the corrupt and insubordinate military violators of human rights to the barracks. Political reform will also be outlined from this view of the rationalisation and modernisation of the political régime, possibly shortening the presidential term to four years, but maintaining the system's presidentialist orientation.

This pragmatism exacerbates the underlying contradiction, that Menem's election also implies, if he hopes to maintain both himself and the system, the removal of the movementist characteristics in the political conduct that were present in the Peronism of 1946 and 1973. In this instance the well oiled political system is able to mold the charismatic leadership of the new president in such a way as to avoid the possible, pernicious excesses of a strongly hegemonic and personalist government.

The party system, which as the last elections show has continued its two party tendency, plays a fundamental part in maintaining the definitive normalisation of the political system. Nonetheless, it will not fulfill its role completely if variables are not included in future political reforms, that determine effectively a new task in the National Congress, until now weak and of little centrality (32). Finally, the UCR should deal in the short term with at least two problems: self criticism of the form of government that landed the country in its present situation; and the clarification of its leadership. Even if Raúl Alfonsín does appear to many analysts to be chiefly responsible for the current state of affairs, it is no less certain that there is no one from among the ranks of the Radicals who could seriously question his leadership.

In political terms, the Argentinian transition finished some time ago: the different democratically appropriate substitutions of the various governmental and parliamentary elites at the national and provincial level have assured a correct alternation of power, which permits talk of the consolidation of the system (33). Curiously, now more than before there are socioeconomic circumstances that justify a profound unrest in the, population without actually upsetting the relative stability of the system. It would appear as though the "age of democracy" that is sweeping through all Latin America has generated all the luck needed to project the new form of government.

Table1

TABLE1				
Results of the presidential election 14.5.89				
Political Association	Electoral Ticket	Votes	%	Electors
FREJUPO	Carlos Menem	7,889,531	47.3	303
U.C.R.	Eduardo Duhalde Eduardo Angeloz	5,412,189	32.5	211
Allianza de Centro	Juan M. Casella Alvaro Alsogaray	1,044,657	6.3	28
Conf. Fed. Indep.	Alberto Natale Eduardo Angeloz	758,360	4.5	24
Blanco de los Jubilados (*)	Cristina Guzmán Jose M° Corzo	317,928	1.9	7
Izquierda Unida	Federico Houssay Nestor Vicente	412,585	2.5	1
Unidad Socialista	Luis F. Zamora G. Estévez Boero	218,755	1.3	0
Provincial political groups with electors				
Fuerza Republicana (Tucumán)		167,624		7
Corriente Renovadora (*) (Santiago del Estero)		112,942		7
Pacto Autonomista Liberal (**) (Corrientes)		103,760		5
Movimiento Popular Neuquino (Neuquen)		35,329		4
Partido Bloquista (San Juan)		36,860		2
Acción Chaqueña (Chaco)		18,857		1
Blank and void votes		355,289	2.1	
Total of registered votes (†)		17,014,193	100	
Total poll		20,021,849		600
(*) Their electors' support given to FREJUPO				
(**) Their electors' support given to Alianza de Centro				
(†) Participation was 84.98%				
SOURCE: Escrutinio Provisional				

Table2(I)

TABLE2 (I)				
Results of the presidential election constituencies				
Constituency	Poll	Political Parties	%	Electors
Capital Federal	2.420.639 (85.28%)	FREJUPO	36.6	21
		U.C.R.	36.3	21
		Alianza de Centro	12.3	7
		Conf. Fed. Independ.	8.7	5
Buenos Aires	7.387.108 (86.94%)	FREJUPO	49.9	77
		U.C.R.	28.9	44
		Alianza de Centro	6.8	10
		Bianco Jubilados	4.6	7
Catamarca	152.444 (84.50%)	Conf. Fed. Independ.	4.2	6
		FREJUPO	56.0	8
		U.C.R.	39.5	6
		FREJUPO	44.6	19
Córdoba	1.805.126 (86.56%)	U.C.R.	42.3	18
		Conf. Fed. Independ.	5.9	2
		Alianza de Centro	3.7	1
		FREJUPO	42.0	8
Corrientes	486.662 (80.29%)	Pacto Aut. Liberal	27.7	5
		U.C.R.	26.6	5
		FREJUPO	51.8	10
		U.C.R.	38.3	7
Chaco	502.667 (79.46%)	Acción Chaqueña	5.0	1
		FREJUPO	42.6	6
		U.C.R.	33.4	5
		Conf. Fed. Independ.	12.5	2
Chubut	185.958 (82.13%)	Alianza de Centro	7.0	1
		FREJUPO	51.6	12
		U.C.R.	39.0	9
		Alianza de Centro	6.0	1
Entre Ríos	660.171 (86.77%)	FREJUPO	58.2	8
		U.C.R.	40.0	6
		FREJUPO	43.1	9
		Conf. Fed. Independ.	18.7	3
Formosa	202.891 (80.04%)	U.C.R.	17.7	3
		Fuerza Republicana	7.4	1
		FREJUPO	51.5	8
		U.C.R.	38.3	6
Jujuy	256.981 (83.00%)	FREJUPO	66.7	10
		U.C.R.	28.4	4
La Pampa	165.873 (88.41%)			
La Rioja	126.659 (84.47%)			

Table2(II)

TABLE2 (II)				
Results of the presidential election constituencies				
Constituency	Poll	Political Parties	%	Electors
Mendoza	826.986 (85.74%)	FREJUPO	42.1	11
		U.C.R.	32.9	8
		Alianza de Centro	16.7	4
		Izquierda Unida	4.0	1
Misiones	400.101 (79.63%)	FREJUPO	52.8	10
		U.C.R.	38.4	8
Neuquen	177.768 (86.34%)	FREJUPO	39.2	6
		U.C.R.	29.3	4
		Mov. Pop. Neuquino	24.0	4
		FREJUPO	47.2	7
Rio Negro	244.381 (86.78%)	U.C.R.	41.8	6
		Alianza de Centro	6.7	1
Salta	462.114 (75.80%)	FREJUPO	41.4	8
		U.C.R.	28.3	6
		Conf. Fed. Indepen.	21.0	4
San Juan	316.899 (83.25%)	FREJUPO	46.4	8
		U.C.R.	28.9	5
		Bloquista	10.6	2
		Alianza de Centro	6.2	1
San Luis	172.505 (86.87%)	FREJUPO	48.4	8
		U.C.R.	41.0	6
Santa Cruz	80.107 (80.10%)	FREJUPO	54.7	8
		U.C.R.	38.2	6
Santa Fe	1.831.446 (86.27%)	FREJUPO	51.5	24
		U.C.R.	33.8	16
		Alianza de Centro	5.9	2
Santiago del Estero	427.369 (72.86%)	Corriente Renov.	37.0	7
		U.C.R.	28.9	6
		FREJUPO	27.3	5
Tucumán	686.476 (81.00%)	FREJUPO	41.3	10
		Fuerza Republicana	27.9	6
		U.C.R.	17.9	4
		Conf. Fed. Indepen.	9.2	2
Tierra del Fuego	42.518 (69.77%)	FREJUPO	42.7	2
		U.C.R.	36.6	2

Table3

TABLE3				
Evolution in the composition of the House of Deputies				
Political Parties	1989	1987	1985	1983
Unión Cívica Radical	93	117(1)	129	129
Partido Justicialista	122	104(2)	101	111
Unión del Centro Democrático	11	7	3	2
Partido Intransigente	2	5	6	3
Pacto Autonomista Liberal	3	4	3	2
Demócrata Cristiano	3	3	2	1
Demócrata Progresista	3	2	1	-
Movimiento Popular Neuquino	2	2	2	2
Renovador de Salta	1	2	1	-
Movimiento de Integración y Des.	-	1	1	-
Conf. Federalista Independiente	3 (3)	-	-	-
Bloquista de San Juan	1	1	1	2
Acción Provincial	1	1	-	-
Demócrata de Mendoza	1	1	1	-
Unidad Socialista	1	1	-	-
Provincial Rionegrino	1	1	-	-
Bandera Blanca	1	1	-	-
Movimiento Popular Jujeño (4)	-	-	2	1
Movimiento Federal Pampeano	-	-	-	1
Movimiento Federal Catamarqueño	-	1	1	-
Izquierda Unida	1	-	-	-
Fuerza Republicana	2	-	-	-
Cruzada Renovadora de San Juan	1	-	-	-
Blanco de los Jubilados	1	-	-	-
Total	254	254	254	254
<p>(1) Includes up to six extraparty member, five linked to the "Convergencia Programática": two from the Movimiento Popular Jujeño, one from the Partido Federal and two from the Bloque Socialista Unificado Cristiano; and one from the Partido Intransigente.</p> <p>(2) Include one extraparty member from Córdoba: Domingo Cavallo (Independent) and one from the Partido Renovador de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.</p> <p>(3) Includes up to two MP's from the Capital Federal Santiago de Estrada.</p> <p>(4) The Movimiento Popular Jujeño integrated the "Convergencia Programática" in 1987 and the Confederación Federalista Independiente in 1989. Inside both hold two MP's.</p>				

Table4

TABLE4	
Electoral results for the House of Deputies 14.5.89	
Political Party	seats
FRE JUPO	66
U.C.R.	41
Alianza de Centro	9
Conf. Federalista Independiente (1)	3
Izquierda Unida	1
Blanco de los Jubilados	1
Fuerza Republicana de Tucumán	2
Corriente Renovadora de S. del Estero (2)	1
Cruzada Renovadora de San Juan	1
Movimiento Popular Neuquino	1
Pacto Autonomista Liberal de Corrientes	1
Total	127
(1) Includes up to one independent from the Capital Federal, one MP from the Partido Renovador de Salta and one MP from the Movimiento Popular Jujeño.	
(2) Incorporated in the peronist group of the House.	

Table5

TABLE5 Elections to the House of Deputies by constituencies (Parliamentary political parties)			
Constituency	Political Parties	% of votes	seats
Capital Federal	FREJUPO	31.5	5
	UCR	28.4	4
	Alianza de Centro	22.0	3
	Conf. Fed. Indepen.	7.2	1
Buenos Aires	FREJUPO	48.4	19
	UCR	26.5	10
	Alianza de Centro	9.9	4
	Izquierda Unida	4.8	1
Catamarca	Blanco Jubilados	4.3	1
	FREJUPO	53.9	2
	UCR	33.3	1
	FREJUPO	43.5	5
Córdoba	UCR	39.1	4
	Pacto Autonom. Lib.	39.2	1
	FREJUPO	32.7	1
	UCR	24.2	1
Chaco	FREJUPO	48.7	2
	UCR	34.8	2
	FREJUPO	38.5	1
	UCR	28.1	1
Entre Ríos	FREJUPO	50.3	3
	UCR	37.1	2
	FREJUPO	57.8	1
	UCR	39.9	1
Jujuy	FREJUPO	42.0	2
	Conf. Fed. Indepen. (1)	19.4	1
	FREJUPO	51.2	2
	UCR	36.9	1
La Rioja	FREJUPO	66.3	2
	UCR	28.4	1
	FREJUPO	41.1	2
	UCR	29.3	2
Mendoza	Alianza de Centro	20.3	1
	FREJUPO	52.5	2
	UCR	36.4	1
	FREJUPO	36.3	1
Neuquén	Movimiento Popular Neuquino	32.9	1
	UCR	23.9	1
	FREJUPO	45.6	1
	UCR	36.4	1
Rio Negro	FREJUPO	40.2	1
	UCR	26.2	1
	Conf. Fed. Indepen.	25.0	1
	Cruzada Renovadora	32.7	1
San Juan	FREJUPO	24.6	1
	UCR	18.3	1
	FREJUPO	46.0	2
	UCR	38.5	1
San Luis	FREJUPO	47.9	5
	UCR	29.1	3
	Alianza de Centro	9.1	1
	FREJUPO	53.2	2
Santa Cruz	UCR	38.4	1
	Corriente Renovadora (3)	37.8	1
	UCR	29.3	1
	FREJUPO	27.8	1
Santiago del Estero	FREJUPO	37.1	2
	Fuerza Republicana	34.6	2
	FREJUPO	38.7	1
	UCR	31.3	1
(1) Integrated in the Confederación of the Movimiento Popular Jujeno. (2) Integrated in the Confederación of the Partido Renovador de Salta. (3) Integrated in the Justicialist group of the House of Deputies.			

Table6

Political Force	Capital Feder.		Buenos Aires		Córdoba		Santa Fe	
	Pres.	Legis.	Pres.	Legis.	Pres.	Legis.	Pres.	Legis.
Peronism (1)	36.9	31.8	54.4	52.7	44.6	43.5	52.3	48.8
Radicalism (2)	45.1	35.6	33.2	29.5	48.3	43.9	35.4	30.0
Wright (3)	12.3	22.0	6.8	9.9	3.7	7.6	5.9	9.2
Left (4)	5.3	10.0	5.0	7.5	3.0	4.5	5.7	11.1
Total	99.6	99.4	99.5	99.6	99.6	99.5	99.3	99.1

(1) Including votes from the FREJUPO parties and votes from Partido Blanco de los Jubilados.

(2) Including votes from the UCR and from the Confederacion Federalista Independiente wich supported Angeloz as its presidential candidate.

(3) Including votes from political parties wich formed the Alianza de Centro.

(4) Including votes from political parties wich formes Izquierda Unida, Unidad Socialista, and Partido Obrero.

Table7

Political Force	San Luis Pres. Legis.		Santa Cruz Pres. Legis.		La Rioja Pres. Legis.		La Pampa Pres. Legis.	
Peronism	49.0	48.3	54.7	53.2	68.4	68.1	51.5	51.2
Radicalism	42.5	38.6	38.2	38.4	28.6	28.5	40.2	38.9
Wright	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.8	1.4	1.2	4.5	5.1
Left	2.5	3.2	2.9	3.3	0.8	0.9	3.3	3.7
Total	97.8	93.9	99.7	99.7	99.2	98.7	99.5	98.9

Note. The criteria defining political forces is the same as TABLE 6.

NOTES

- (1) CAVAROZZI, Marcelo: Sindicatos y política In Argentina Estudios CEDES. Buenos Aires 1984. p. 176.
- (2) The official rate of exchanged passed from 13.94 australes in the dollar in January to 87.00 australes on May 3th 1989. The cost of living in one year grew 461% and prices grew 58% in April. La Nación. Buenos Aires 6.5.89.
- (3) BOTANA, Natalio and MUSTAPIC, Ana Maria: La reforma constitucional frente al Régimen Político argentino. In Serie Documentos de Trabajo nº 101. Centro. de Investigaciones Sociales. Instituto Torcuato di Tella. Buenos Aires 1988.
- (4) SMULOVITZ, Catalina: Constitución y consolidación democrática en Argentina. ¿Reformar o no reformar? Documento CEDES nº 3. Buenos Aires 1988.
- (5) DE RIZ, Liliana: "Notas sobre Parlamento y Partidos en la Argentina de hoy" in Democracia. orden Político y Parlamento fuerte Biblioteca Política Argentina nQ 65. Buenos Aires 1984. p. 121.
- (6) At the inauguration of the 107th period of ordinary meetings, president Alfonsín spoke to the Congress in these terms: "Siempre pensé -y lo dije varias veces- que la prueba decisiva del éxito del camino iniciado en 1983 era llegar a las elecciones de 1989" (I always thought -and I say-so many times- that the decisive proof of the success of the path begun in 1983 was its arrival at the 1989 elections). Transcript of the speech in La Nación. Buenos Aires 2.5.89.
- (7) LAMOUNIER, Bolívar: "Perspectivas da consolidação democrática: o caso brasileiro". Revista Brasileira de Ciencias Sociais. 4. 1987. pp. 43-64.
- (8) NOHLEN, Dieter: "¿Más democracia en América Latina?". SINTESIS. nº 7. AIETI. Madrid 1989.
- (9) LINZ, Juan J.: La quiebra de las democracias. Alianza Universidad, nº 497. Madrid 1987.
- (10) DAHL, Robert: Polyarchy. Participation and opposition. New Haven. London 1971.
- (11) Alain Rouquié is in favour of the first option while Agustín Cueva supports the second.
- (12) See Table III about the evolution of the composition of the Chamber of Deputies.
- (13) Article 81 of the Constitution establishes that the electoral assembly that elects the president should meet "cuatro meses antes que concluya el término del presidente cesante" (four months before the end of the current presidential term); this term, according to article 77 is six years. As Raúl Alfonsín was on duty on December the 10th 1983 he should conclude his term on December 10th 1989, the electoral assembly should meet on August the 10th 1989 at the latest.
- (14) BOTANA, Natalio: El orden conservador. Editorial Sudamericana. Buenos Aires 1985, p. 85-97; and the same author La tradición republicana. Editorial Sudamericana. Buenos Aires 1984, pp. 340-354.
- (15) The relationship of votes/electors and votes/deputies in these elections for the different constituencies was as follows:
- | Constituency | votes/electors | votes/deputies |
|--------------|----------------|----------------|
| Cap. Federal | 37.338 | 155.095 |
| Buenos Aires | 42.842 | 176.266 |
| Catamarca | 9.115 | 42.540 |
| Córdoba | 37.873 | 168.325 |
| Corrientes | 21.361 | 128.171 |
| Chaco | 22.534 | 101.406 |

Chubut	9.960	69.721
Entre Rios	25.316	111.394
Formosa	10.901	76.313
Jujuy	12.489	66.612
La Pampa	10.250	47.835
La Rioja	7.210	50.470
Mendoza	29.247	140.390
Misiones	16.639	99.838
Neuquen	10.698	49.926
Rio Negro	13.606	95.247
Salta	20.256	121.539
San Juan	16.533	88.178
San Luis	10.157	47.402
Santa Cruz	4.272	19.937
Santa Fe	36.924	172.313
S. del Estero	17.002	102.014
Tucumán	24.388	134.137
T. del Fuego	7.476	14.954

(16) Conferences and press reports helped to create different fantasies. La Nación published several articles: BOTANA, Natalio: "Cuando no hubo mayoría en las Juntas de electores, los Comicios de 1868, 1916 y 1963". 22.4.89; LUDER, italo: "La elección presidencial y los partidos políticos". 6.5.89; BADENI, Gregorio: "Los ciudadanos sólo deben obediencia a la constitución". 9.5.89; FLORIA, Carlos: "La distancia entre la sociedad y sus dirigentes". 11.5.89; DEL CARRIL, Bonifacio: "El quorum del Congreso en la elección presidencial". 12.5.89.

(17) The political groups at the national level with their Candidates for President and Vicepresident were:

Political Group	Cand. For Presid. Vicepres.	Cand. for
(1)	Angel Bustelo	Eduardo Hernandez
(2)	Alvaro Alsogaray	Alberto Natale
(3)	Nestor Vicente	Luis Zamora
(4)	G. Estevez Boero	Alfredo Bravo
(5)	José Corzo Gómez	Federico Houssay
(6)	Eduardo Angeloz	M. Cristina Guzmán
(7)	Carlos Menem	Eduardo Duhalde
(8)	Luis A. Ammann	Lia V. Mendez
(9)	Jorge Altamira	Gregorio Flores
(10)	Eduardo Angeloz	Juan M. Casella
(1)	Acuerdo Popular	(6) Conf.Fed.Indepen.
(2)	Alianza de Centro	(7) FREJUPO
(3)	Al. Izquierda Unida	(8) Humanista Verde
(4)	Al. Unidad Social	(9) Partido Obrero
(5)	Blanco Jubilados	(10) UCR

Source: Dirección Nacional Electoral. Ministerio del Interior.

(18) The Frente Justicialista de Unidad Popular (FREJUPO) was formed by: Partido Justicialista, Partido Intransigente, Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo, Movimiento Nacionalista Constitucional, Movimiento Patriótico de Liberación, Partido del Trabajo y del Pueblo, Confederación Laborista, Partido Conservador Popular and Partido Demócrata Cristiano.

(19) The Confederación Federalista Independiente was formed by: The Partido Federal, the Partido Renovador de Salta, the Línea Popular de Entre Rios, the Línea Popular de La Rioja, the Movimiento Popular Jujueño, the Movimiento Popular Catamarqueño and the Acción Transformadora.

(20) The Alianza de Centro was formed by: the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCeDé), the Partido

Demócrata Progresista and the Concentración Demócrata.

- (21) The Alianza Izquierda Unida was formed by: the Partido Comunista and the Movimiento al Socialismo. The Alianza Unidad Socialista was formed by the Partido Socialista Democrático and the Partido Socialista Popular.
- (22) Predictions at the Centro de Estudios de la Opinión Pública showed that the difference in favour of Menem versus Angeloz at the beginning of January 1989 was 6.7% going down to 5.3% at the end of the following month. See Clarín, Buenos Aires 11.5.89.
- (23) Agreeing with Burke's prediction. La Nación. Buenos Aires 6.5.89.
- (24) Agreeing with Mora y Araujo, Noguera y Asociados prediction. La Nación. Buenos Aires 7.5.89.
- (25) FRAGA, Rosendo: Claves de la campaña electoral 1989. Editorial Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoría. Buenos Aires 1989, P. 155.
- (26) Although Menem did not participate "in live" programs obviously he did not close his television campaign weeks before. His publicity messages and the news from his campaign thorough the country were covered by television until the very last moment.
- (27) The results given in the legislative provincial elections in 1987 affected the composition of the Senate, whose third should be removed in 1989 maintaining an absolute peronist majority.
- (28) This procedure instituted by the majority parties hoping to benefit from the pull of their national candidates could be substituted by the establishment of a number of ballot boxes equal to the number of elections being carried out, or by voting individualized for the candidates in each election.
- (29) For example, if two per cent of the left voted Angeloz for president (being afraid of Menem) and another two per cent of the right voted Menem (disappointed by Alfonsín), this behaviour can not be measured but is politically meaningful and even can lead to further alliances.
- (30) Criterio, Magazine, Buenos Aires, nº 2026, 27.4.89, published "Antes de votar", referred to the successful performance in the field of politics of Alfonsín Government due to a proper action at a constitutional level; however, it did not succeed in economics. It reinforced this opinion comparing constitution and money role in both aspects: "The country at this moment-does not have a currency worthy of name, and a currency is to the economic system what the constitution is to the political system. Without a currency the social actors debate in a sort of natural state because they lack the basic contract that would give rhyme and reason to their transactions. It is known that in Hobbes's description the essence of a natural state is the struggle of everyone against everyone because there is no arbitrator able to resolve peacefully the conflicts between the parties. In our society the state no longer acts as an arbitrator", p. 147. See also: PORTANTIERO, Juan C.: "Corporaciones y partidos políticos en, la transición" in El futuro de la democracia argentina. Fundación Rafael Campalans. Barcelona 1989. He points out that "the transition supposes not only the construction of a political regime but also transformation of an economic order", p. 36.
- (31) CHUMBITA, Hugo: "El significado democrático de la evolución del justicialismo" El futuro de la democracia argentina op. cit., p. 50.
- (32) DE RIZ, Liliana; MUSTAPIC, Ana M.; GORETTI, Mateo, and PANOSYAN, Mónica: Parlamento hoy. CEDES. Buenos Aires 1986.
- (33) "Today, Argentina's political system looks more familiar to the North American and European democracies". WYNIA, Gary W.: "Campaigning for President in Argentina". Current History nº 536. March 1989, p. 133.